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BANKERS LIFE: PAYING FOR A
CORPORATION BY SELLING ITS SECURITIES
VIOLATES 10b-5
Securities fraud and the rule which prohibits it, the ubiquitous
lOb-5,1 are familiar terms in the complex field of securities regula-
tion.2 From comparatively modest beginnings3 the coverage of the
rule has expanded to the point that lOb-5 has been said to form the
basis for federal corporation law.' This development has taken place
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971).
THE FOLLOWING HEREINAFTER CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RuLE 101-5 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
BROMBERG];
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
2. In what is probably the only treatise devoted to a single administrative rule, the author
asserts:
It now appears once or twice a week in reported cases and represents about one-third
of all current cases, public and private, unier the whole array of SEC statutes. . . . lOb-
5 is generating almost as much litigation as all the other general antifraud provisions
together. . . . It is by now such a dominant factor in private securities litigation that
one is surprised when it does not turn up, and a court does not hesitate to introduce it
as a major consideration if the plaintiff fails to plead it. BROMBERG § 2.5(b).
3. Milton Freeman, the author of the rule, has stated that it was drafted hastily:
I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together, and the
only discussion we had there was where "in connection with the purchase or sale" should
be, and we decided it should be at the end. Conference on Codification of the Federal
Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967) (speech by Milton V. Freeman).
Section 10(b) was promulgated in reponse to a specific scheme:
[T]he president of some company [was] . . . going around buying up the stock of his
company from his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that
the company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadru-
pled and will be $2.00 a year for the coming year. Id.
Approval was virtually without discussion:
Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike, who said, "Well, . . . we are against fraud,
aren't we?" Id.
4. See, e.g., Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by
Implication Through I0b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 185 (1964) for a critical discussion of this trend.
Professor Cary, W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 14 (4th ed. 1969), claims
credit for first using the term "federal corporation law" in the previous edition of his casebook,
R. BAKER & W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 564 (3d ed. 1958). It has
been used in at least two cases: McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir.),
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almost exclusively in the district courts and circuit courts of appeals
with only one Supreme Court interpretation of lOb-5 in the nearly
thirty years of its existence.5 Recently, however, the Supreme Court
re-entered the arena of lOb-5 adjudication, ruling, in Superintendent
of Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.,' that a
liquidator/plaintiff bringing a derivative suit7 states a cause of action
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule
I Ob-5 by alleging that the corporation's sole shareholder fraudulently
misappropriated for his own uses the proceeds of a sale of govern-
ment bonds held by the corporation. This Note will summarize the
facts and various holdings in the litigation of Bankers Life, discuss
the pre-Bankers Life parameters in 1Ob-5 adjudication, and analyze
the Supreme Court's opinion in Bankers Life, in order to determine
what effect, if any, the case will have on the development of rule I Ob-
5.
In the fall of 1961, Bankers Life and Casualty Company (Bankers
Life) agreed to sell its wholly-owned subsidiary, Manhattan Casualty
Company (Manhattan), to James Begole for five million dollars.'
Prior to the closing in January, 1962, Begole borrowed the five mil-
lion dollars from Irving Trust Company, receiving a check drawn on
Irving Trust which he used to pay Bankers Life for its delivery of all
of the outstanding shares of Manhattan. On the same day, Begole
caused Manhattan to sell government bonds with a face value of five
million dollars, depositing the proceeds of this sale in a newly created
Manhattan account at the Irving Trust Company. Irving Trust
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961). See also
Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law:" An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965);
Friendly, In Praise of Erie and the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 384, 413-
14 (1964).
5. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). The rule was promulgated (as Rule X-
10B-5) in 1942. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), reprinted
in BROMBERG 295. (Editor's Note: Since this Note was written the Supreme Court has decided
another lob-5 case. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 40 U.S.L.W. 4448 (U.S. Apr. 24,
1972). See note 41 infra).
6. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
7. The Superintendent's standing was based on a New York statute:
The Superintendent and his successors shall be vested by operation of law to all of the
.. .rights of action of such insurers as of the date of the entry of the order so directing
them to liquidate. N.Y. INs. LAW § 514 (McKinney 1966).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
9. The facts are stated in greater detail in the opinion of the district court, 300 F. Supp.
1083, 1087-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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charged its check for the purchase of the Manhattan shares against
this account. Begole and his associates then engaged in a series of
complicated transactions through which Begole manipulated Man-
hattan's books to reflect only the sale of its government bonds and
the purchase of a five million dollar certificate of deposit.'" The cor-
poration's books did not show that Manhattan's assets had been
depleted or that Begole had used the proceeds of the bond sale to
finance his acquisition of Manhattan's stock from Bankers Life.
Some time subsequent to these transactions, the Superintendent of
Insurance of the State of New York declared Manhattan insolvent
and commenced liquidation proceedings. 1
After an abortive attempt to sue in the state courts, 2 the Superin-
tendent of Insurance, in his derivative capacity as liquidator, 3
brought an action in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York, 4 naming as defendants Begole, Bankers
Life, Irving Trust, and other individuals and banking institutions that
had participated in the sale of control of Manhattan, the subsequent
misappropriation of the proceeds from the sale of the bonds, and the
attempt to camouflage the true nature of the transactions. Asserting
that he had standing to sue by virtue of the fact that Manhattan was
the purchaser of its own stock, the Superintendent argued that the
transactions, when integrated, revealed a scheme to defraud Manhat-
tan and its creditors in violation of section 17(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1933.11 The district court rejected this claim, saying
that it is conceptually impossible for a corporation to purchase all of
10. 404 U.S. at 8. Irving Trust issued another check for five million dollars to Manhattan.
The president of Manhattan tendered this check to Belgian-American Bank & Trust Co. which
then issued a five million dollar certificate of deposit in the name of Manhattan. This certificate
of deposit was carried on Manhattan's books as an asset, but was, in fact, later endorsed to
New England Note Corp., controlled by an associate of Begole's. The New England Note Corp.
endorsed the certificate to Belgian-American Banking Corp. as collateral for a five million
dollar loan. The proceeds of the loan were then turned over to Irving trust.
II. The relevant statutes are N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 93 (defining insolvency of an insurer),
511 (a) (stating insolvency of an insurer as a ground for liquidation), and 513 (permitting the
superintendent of insurance to liquidate insurance companies) (McKinney 1966).
12. The plaintiff had first brought suit in the New York County Supreme Court in 1965
alleging common law fraud. The factual allegations of the earlier complaint were essentially
the same as those filed in the district court. After joinder of claims in the state case, further
proceedings in the action had been enjoined. 300 F. Supp. at 1104 n.17.
13. See note 7 supra.
14. 300 F. Supp. 1083 (1969).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
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its outstanding shares without dissolution, because a corporation may
not exist unless some other person or entity serves as proprietor or
owner. 6 Further, the court noted that Manhattan was not a purchaser
within the meaning of section 17(a) since it did not qualify as "one
who was a party to a transaction whereby he was to assume owner-
ship of securities in exchange for valuable consideration."' 7 The
plaintiff then orally amended his complaint in open court, arguing
that Manhattan's sale of the bonds, Begole's misappropriation of the
proceeds, and the cover-up transactions involving the certificates of
deposit gave rise to a cause of action under section 10(b) of the 1934
Act and rule I Ob-5. Withholding judgment as to the propriety of oral
modifications to pleadings,"8 the court found that Manhattan was
clearly a seller of the government bonds and thus, as to the threshold
issue of standing, was empowered to maintain an action on that sale.
Turning to the merits of the claim, the district court ruled that
mere allegations of fraudulent misappropriation of proceeds from the
sale of bonds did not state a cause of action cognizable under rule
10b-5. Drawing from other lOb-5 cases, the court reasoned that the
rule was designed to maintain the integrity of the securities market.,'
Since Manhattan sold the bonds for their full value, the court was
persuaded that the integrity of the securities market was unblemished
by the misappropriation of the proceeds after the sale."0 In so decid-
ing, the court stated:
the consummation of a security transaction as a mere incident of a fraudulent
scheme and the mere fact of injury caused by the fraud, in the absence of any
16. 300 F. Supp. at 1098.
17. Id.
18. Id. Modification was allowed by the court since a complaint which states facts with
sufficient clarity to give adequate notice of the transaction and which would allow relief under
any legal theory is generally deemed sufficient. Id. at 1093, citing IA W. BARRON & A.
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 276.1 (Wright ed. 1960) and 2A J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE- 8.14 (2d ed. 1968).
19. 300 F. Supp. at 1101. The court, id. at 1102-04, found that impairment of the purity of
the market was the common denominator of these cases: Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. deniedsub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Mutual
Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); A.T. Brod v. Perlow, 375 F.2d
393 (2d Cir. 1967) (manipulative effect on the market); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d
24 (2d Cir. 1964); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961) (danger of watered stock); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F.
Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (abuse of the trading process).
20. 300 F. Supp. at 1104. The reference here is to the time when the proceeds from the
sale of Manhattan's bonds were used to pay off the loan from Irving Trust-a time clearly after
the sale of the bonds.
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possibility that the fraud might materially affect the purity of the security
transaction and the purity of the trading process would not make the fraud
federally cognizable .2
Finding an analogy in conspiracy cases, the district judge further
noted that "Rule 1Ob-5 requires the employment of fraud in connec-
tion with a security transaction, which is essentially different from the
effectuation of a security transaction in connection with a fraudulent
activity."22 A legal act in furtherance of a conspiracy may be part of
the proof of the existence of q conspiracy, but such act is not indepen-
dently punishable. Similarly, the sale of the bonds did not give rise
to a cause of action; the proscribed activity was looting the corpora-
tion, a breach of fiduciary duty punishable under state law but not
under the 1934 Act.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, 23 utilizing
basically the same rationale employed by the district court judge. It
distinguished the fraud by Begole from 10b-5 fraud in that Begole's
sole object was to obtain possession of the bonds for his personal use
rather than to affect either the securities market or the investing
public. The sales transaction itself was not tainted since the purchaser
paid the full and fair market price for the bonds. Rather, the fraud
lay in the subsequent misappropriation of the proceeds, an act involv-
ing waste of Manhattan's corporate assets and giving rise to a claim
cognizable only under state law. The court conceded that the
Securities Exchange Act gave the SEC power to promulgate rules
"appropriate in the public interest" as well as "for the protection of
investors," and agreed that the public interest was involved when a
corporation which is subject to regulation by the state Superintendent
of Insurance is defrauded. 24 The court of appeals nevertheless main-
tained that "the public interest cognizable by section 10(b) is limited
to preserving the integrity of the securities markets."" The securities
acts were not, it reasoned, designed to "create an unlimited federal
right of action for damages for all who have been defrauded in any
area of economic activity. '2 6
The Supreme Court, in an unanimous opinion written by Justice
Douglas, reversed and remanded the case for a new trial against all
21. Id. at 1101.
22. Id. at 1102.
23. 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970).
24. Id. at 361.
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Id.
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defendants.27 The most important factor in the Court's disposition of
the case was that Manhattan and the community of interest it repre-
sented-the policyholders and creditors-had "suffered an injury as
a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an
investor." The Court agreed with the lower tribunals that Manhat-
tan had standing under rule 1Ob-5 as a seller of the bonds.21 It found,
however, that the fraud was not limited to a misappropriation of
proceeds, but was definitely in connection with the sale, since the
"seller was duped into believing that it, the seller, would receive the
proceeds."3 The fact that the complaint alleged deceit of Manhattan
by its sole shareholder created no conceptual problems for the Court.
Reasoning that lOb-5 recovery is not limited to those types of fraud
which adversely affect the integrity of the securities market," the
Court found it irrelevant that the fraud involved a misappropriation
of proceeds from the sale of a security rather than the more com-
monly encountered sale of a security for an inadequate considera-
tion.3 2 According to the Court's analysis, the requisites of lOb-5
culpability are met whenever there is a sale of a security and fraud
in connection with that sale. Further, it noted that the fraud require-
ment is satisfied by an allegation of breach of fiduciary duty even if
those who are injured by such a breach are non-investors, in this case,
the creditors of the defrauded corporation.3
Prior Judicial Treatment of Rule lOb-5
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 declares it
to be illegal "[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security ...any manipulative or deceptive device
. . "' Rule lOb-5 makes it unlawful for any person to employ any
artifice, scheme, or device to defraud; to state, or to fail to state, any
27. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
28. Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 9. See text following note 18 supra for a discussion of Manhattan's standing as a
defrauded seller of securities.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 10, 12.
32. Id. The Court's language on this point is confusing: "Likewise irrelevant is the fact that
the proceeds of the sale that were due the seller were misappropriated." Since there would have
been no suit if there had been no misappropriation, it is assumed that the Court meant that it
regarded the fact that the fraud involved a misappropriation of proceeds, rather than some
other, more commonly encountered scheme, was irrelevant.
33. Id. at 12.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
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material fact which, with regard to the surrounding circumstances,
would be misleading; or to participate "in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity." Although the rule does not expressly provide for civil liabil-
ity, since Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.3 the courts have held that
civil redress is available to a defrauded claimant. Further, 1Ob-5
claimants have not been subjected to a rigid adherence to the
common-law elements of fraudY.3  Depending on the policy sought to
be protected,38 the courts have emphasized or minimized such tradi-
tional fraud requirements as privity,39 scienter, 0 and ieliance.4 '
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971).
36. 69 F. Supp. 512, modified, 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1946), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613
(E.D. Pa. 1947).
37. See, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1967);
Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965). See generally BROMBERG § 2.7(1) and
authorities cited therein. For a discussion of the common law elements of fraud see W. PROS-
SER, THE LAw OF TORTS §§ 100-03 (3d ed. 1964). See also Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907, 910 (1961).
38. A few of the sometimes conflicting, often unarticulated, policy considerations that
might influence a court's decision are: (1) the court's concern that business executives, seem-
ingly innocent of any intentional wrongdoing, not be subjected to liability under the federal
fraud statutes; (2) the court's hesitation to expand federal corporation law; and (3) the court's
desire to give the fullest protection to the investing public.
39. Compare Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., [1961-64 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 91,317 (N.D. I1l. 1964) and Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243-44
(S.D.N.Y. 1962) with Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 218 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
Without using the word "privity" the Second Circuit seems to have rejected it as a requirement.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Kline
v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity
and State of Mind in Rule lob-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423,444 n. 107,
448 (1968). See generally BROMBERG § 8.5; Loss 1767; Comment, Civil Liability Under Sec-
tion lOB and Rule 1OB-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J.
658 (1965).
40. See SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1966); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d
634 (7th Cir. 1963); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961); Texas Continental Life
Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962). But see Weber
v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Trussel v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228
F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964); cf. Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See
generally BROMBERG § 8.4; Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions Under lob-5, 48
N.C.L. REV. 482 (1970); Ruder, supra note 39, at 446; Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a
Private Suit Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule lob-5, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1070 (1965).
41. The Supreme Court has rejected the element of reliance for a lob-5 recovery when
material facts were not disclosed. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 40 U.S.L.W. 4448
(U.S. Apr. 24, 1972). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 963-64 (2d Cir.
1968); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Ruder, Civil Liability
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The major obstacle to prospective lOb-5 plaintiffs has been the
Second Circuit's decision in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,"
where the minority shareholders of a corporation sued the present
and former majority shareholder alleging fraud in connection with
the sale of his majority interest in the company at a premium. The
court analyzed the history of the 1934 Act and decided that the
minority shareholders lacked standing to sue.43 In so holding, the
Second Circuit established the purchaser-seller obstacle:
[Section 101 was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent
practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather than
at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and . . . Rule X-I0B-54
extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or seller.5
Since this purchaser-seller requirement operates to deny plaintiffs
a federal forum48 and the procedural advantages of lOb-5,41 the pres-
sures on it have been relentless. The SEC has urged that Birnbaum
be overruled in several amicus appearances." While some commenta-
tors consider the purchaser-seller requirement to be sound,49 most
Under lob-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 627, 678 (1963). See
generally BROMBERG § 8.6(1), (2).
42. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
43. 193 F.2d at 464.
44. X-10B-5 was the original designation; the wording was identical to 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1971). See note 5 supra.
45. 193 F.2d at 464 (emphasis added).
46. The federal courts are vested with exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the securities laws.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). A plaintikbarred by the purchaser-seller requirement from asserting
a federal claim must find some independent source of jurisdiction, such as diversity of citizen-
ship, and would also have to allege damages of at least $10,000 to bring suit in the federal courts.
Among the advantages to bringing suit under the Securities Acts, rather than state "Blue Sky"
laws, are more liberal discovery provisions, a generally more sympathetic judiciary, and in
difficult cases presenting novel questions, the help of the SEC as amicus. See generally
BROMBERG § 2.7(1)-(3).
47. For example, in addition to the advantages generally enjoyed by litigants in the federal
courts, the lOb-5 plaintiff enjoys relaxed venue requirements and world-wide service of process.
See BROMBERG §§ 11.3, 11.4. A lOb-5 action is preferable even to one brought under the
overlapping provisions of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act; see Loss 1782-90.
48. See. e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 633 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 970 (1970); Brief for SEC, 119 BNA SEc. REG. L. REP. A-8 (Sept. 22, 1971) (where the
SEC argued that the purchaser-seller doctrine was a judicially established limitation not neces-
sarily required by the language of the rule).
49. See, e.g., Loss 1469; Bradford, Rule lOb-5: The Search for a Limiting Doctrine, 19
BUFFALO L. REv. 205,210 (1970); Comment, The Expanding Uses of Rule lob-5, 10 B.C. IND.
& CoM. L. REv. 313; 316-17 (1969).
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denounce it," including one well-known conservative who is critical
of the sweep of 1Ob-5. 51 It has been pronounced dead by a hopeful 2
commentator and at least two lower court judges. 3 Nevertheless,
although it has suffered as many blows at the hands of its enemies
as Rasputin, it has, like the mad monk, continued to show an amaz-
ing vitality at least where the plaintiffs seek money damages." Per-
haps the factor contributing most to the survival of the purchaser-
seller requirement has been the willingness of courts to expand the
definitions of purchase and sale to include contracts to purchase or
sell,"5 "constructive sales," 8 aborted sales,57 mergers in which stock
is traded rather than exchanged for money," even to unconsummated
mergers59 and resolutions to liquidate."
Several other prerequisites to lOb-5 actions have been discarded
50. See, e.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule l0b-
5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Rule: An Archaic Tool for
Determining Standing Under Rule JOb-5, 56 GEO. L.J. 1177 (1968); Comment, SEC Rule X-
IOB-5: Guided Missile or Flying Saucer?, 32 TEx. L. REV. 197, 206 (1953); Comment, Private
Enforcement Under Rule lob-5: An Injunction for a Corporate Issuer?, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
618, 622 (1967); Note, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to SEC Rule lOb-5, 53 CORNELL L.Q.
684, 697-99 (1968); Note, Civil Liability Under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 VA. L. REV. 537, 570 (1956).
51. Ruder, Current Developments in the Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary Rela-
tions-Standing to Sue under Rule lOb-5, 26 Bus. LAW. 1289 (1971). Mr. Ruder has written
several articles criticizing judicial expansion of rule lob-5. See, e.g., Ruder, supra notes 4 &
41.
52. Lowenfels, supra note 50.
53. Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972); Entel v. Allen, 270
F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); see text accompanying notes 109-11 infra.
54, Injunctive relief has been granted to plaintiffs who were neither purchasers nor sellers
of securities. See, e.g., Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1969); Mutual Shares
Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). However, where damages are sought, the
continued existence of the requirement has been affirmed. See, e.g., Iroquois Indus., Inc. v.
Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970); Green-
stein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968).
55. See, e.g., Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967); M.L. Lee
& Co. v. American Cardboard & Packing Corp., 36 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
56. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 970 (1967).
57. Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 1 92,591 (N.D. III. 1969).
58. Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Young v. Mader,
394 U.S. 930 (1969). See also Note, Securities Regulation-Statutory Merger Involves a
"Purchase" or "Sale" Under Section 10(b), 36 FORD. L. REV. 632 (1967).
59. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1970).
60. Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970).
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or relaxed by the courts. The other Birnbaum requirements," for
instance, have been far less hardy than the purchaser-seller doctrine.
When shareholders began bringing derivative actions alleging lOb-5
violations with respect to corporate stock, acts of fraudulent corpo-
rate mismanagement involving the sale of such stock for inadequate
consideration were brought within the ambit of the rule." The re-
quirement that the fraud be of the sort usually associated with securi-
ties transactions has been expressly repudiated by the circuit which
imposed itA3 Finally, in deciding whether the fraud alleged was "in
connection with a purchase or sale of securities" courts have, without
the benefit of a consistent rationale, loosened the necessary connec-
tion.6 4
Analysis of Bankers Life
At first glance, the Supreme Court's opinion does not appear to
break new ground in rule lOb-5 adjudication. Manhattan was clearly
a satisfactory Birnbaum seller of the bonds, and as an investor was
duped into selling its securities for nothing. Further, in finding lOb-
5 fraud where the event fulfilling the deceitful purpose took place
after the securities transaction which gave the plaintiff standing, the
Court could look to the Second Circuit itself for precedent." A close
61. See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra and notes 62-63 infra.
62. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. deniedsub non. Manley
v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
63. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
64. See Comment, SEC Rule lob-5 "In Connection with the Purchase or Sale of Any
Security" Restriction: Need for Analytical Precision, 5 COLUM. J. Soc. PROB. 28, 32 (1969).
65. The Superintendent alleged that Begole deceived an innocent board of directors into
authorizing the sale by telling them that the proceeds were to be used to purchase a certificate
of deposit. Since the instant case involved only the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's allegations
were accepted as being true. As the district court pointed out, however, the evidence strongly
pointed to the conclusion that the president of Manhattan and the board which authorized the
sale were Begole's henchmen. 300 F. Supp. at 1089 n.6. Even if the facts in Bankers Life were
such, the Second Circuit has held that the deceit requirements of rule 10b-5 are satisfied when
the corporation's complaint alleges a breach of fiduciary duty by a corporation's entire board
of directors in connection with that corporation's purchase or sale of securities. Schoenbaum
v. Firstbrook, 405 F,2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), discussed in Note, Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Involving Full Director Knowledge Held lOb-5 Violation, 1969 DUKE L.J. 383. More recently
the Fifth Circuit has held that a corporation can be deceived by a scheme in which all of its
officers, directors, and stockholders took part. Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241
(5th Cir. 1971). See Note, Fiduciary Suit Under Rule lOb-5, 1968 DUKE L.J. 791, 795-98, for
a discussion of "deceit" of a corporation by its directors.
66. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967). Perlow was a "free rider,"
an investor who ordered securities from a broker, and planned to resell them before the time
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scrutiny of the opinion, however, raises several questions as to
whether-and to what extent-the reach of the rule has been ex-
tended. It is arguable that the Court has significantly enlarged both
the categories of offenses under lOb-5 and the class of parties pro-
tected by the rule.
New lOb-5 Violations
Integrated Scheme to Sell Securities and Misappropriate Pro-
ceeds. Prior cases involving allegations of fraudulent mismanage-
ment sufficient to state a lOb-5 cause of action were distinguishable
from Bankers Life in one respect-considered vital until the Supreme
Court declared it irrelevant. In previous cases, the stock which
formed part of the capitalization of the company was sold for an
inadequate consideration.67 In Bankers Life a corporate asset, held
for investment, was converted to cash, which was then misappro-
priated by the holder of all of the capital stock of the company.68 In
the former situation, the sale of securities forming the capitalization
is the sine qua non of the fraud, the purpose of which is to cheat the
company by transferring a share of the equity at an unfair "bargain"
price. While the transfer of shares at an improperly determined price
has been a lOb-5 violation from the inception of the rule, 9 the
Bankers Life holding extends lOb-5 to reach fraudulent practices
whenever they incidentally involve securities transactions. In con-
tending that 1Ob-5 had been violated, the Superintendent argued that
there would have been no fraud without a sale of securities, and no
sale of securities without fraud; therefore, there was fraud in connec-
tion with the sale. 7" Although this line of reasoning ultimately pre-
vailed in Bankers Life, it is nonetheless troublesome when Begole's
scheme is more closely analyzed. The Supreme Court's decision
turned on the fact that Begole accomplished his goal of looting Man-
due for payment-if the securities increased in value. If the price of the securities declined he
would refuse to pay, forcing the broker to resell the securities at a loss. The defrauded broker
acquired standing as a "purchaser" when he bought the securities for Perlow. The event
fulfilling the fraudulent purpose occurred when Perlow reneged on payment-after the broker's
purchase.
67. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968); Hooper v. Mountain
States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960).
68. See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
69. See note 3 supra.
70. Brief of Superintendent of Insurance, reprinted in 101 BNA SEC. REG. L. REP. H-I,
at H-3 (May 12, 1971).
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hattan through the sale of assets which were classified as securities
under the 1934 Act. If Begole had sold land belonging to Manhattan
valued at five million dollars, again misappropriating the proceeds,
all parties to this litigation would stand in the same position finan-
cially, but would have no l0b-5 claim. Further, if the Bankers Life
test is applied to corporations whose assets include both eight month
and ten month notes, identical in every respect except for time of
payment, conversion of the former would not give rise to 1Ob-5 liabil-
ity but conversion of the latter would .7 Such distinctions are analyti-
cally troublesome. Also, they will lead to what may be undesirable
results. For example, since any sort of scheme remotely involving a
security may become a lb-5 violation, potential litigants will press
for a loosening of the definition of "security," arguing that to do
otherwise would only encourage
a certain class of gentleman of the "J. Rufus Wallingford" type-"they toil
not, neither do they spin"-[to] lie awake nights endeavoring to conceive some
devious and shadowy way of evading the law."
Misappropriating Proceeds of an Innocent Sale of Securities. In
his brief3 and in oral argument, 4 the Superintendent asserted that
mere conversion of proceeds from a sale of securities itself constitutes
a violation of lOb-5. The Court indicated its interest in this theory
by putting a hypothetical case to counsel for the plaintiff: "Suppose
the sale had occurred. Then when the man was walking back from
the bank, the idea of misappropriating the funds first came to him
and he did this . . -71 The lawyer replied that the hypothetical
stated a violation of lOb-5, but noted that the instant case was distin-
71. According to the 1934 Act, the definition of security "shall not include currency or any
note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance
of not exceeding nine months. ... 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(10) (1970).
72. State v. Whiteaker, 118 Ore. 656, 661, 247 P. 1077, 1079 (1926). In that case, arising
under the Blue Sky Laws of Oregon, the defense was that the fraud did not involve a "security"
as defined by those laws. The judge disagreed and for the reasons stated above, argued that
the definition of "security" should receive a broad interpretation. It is submitted that one
danger of basing 10b-5 culpability on the instrumentality-rather than the type of fraud-will
be a blurring of the definition of "security" under the 1934 Act in an effort to foil modern.day
"J. Rufus Wallingsfords." Compare Johnson v. Espey, - F.2d , (2d Cir. 1972) (10b-5
extended to cover commodity account) with McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., - F. Supp.
(E.D. La. 1972) (10b-5 does not cover commodity accounts),
73. Brief of Superintendent, note 70 supra, at H-4.
74. See the excerpts from the oral arguments before the Supreme Court, reprinted in 40
U.S.L.W. 3173, at 3174 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1971).
75. Id. (the question was posed by Justice White).
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guishable since the alleged scheme preceded the sale. Apparently the
Court found the distinction to have no legal significance, since it held
the fact that the scheme involved a misappropration of proceeds was
irrelevant," and cited several cases relied on by the Superintendent
to support his argument that the conversion of proceeds-without
proof of a scheme antedating the sale-violated the rule.71 Actually
the cases cited involved the converse of the Superintendent's the-
sis-that is, the defendants had converted securities rather than pro-
ceeds.7" Since both types of cases involve conversions of property in
connection with a sale of securities, these cases do lend superficial
support to the Superintendent's proposition. However,unless this ex-
tension of lOb-5 liability is limited to fact situations such as the one
presented by the Court's hypothetical where one of the parties to the
securities transaction converts the proceeds within a short time of the
transaction, the sweep of the rule can be boundless. Without such
limitations lOb-5 would be violated by any conversion of corporate
assets which could be even remotely traceable to a previous sale of
securities.
Sale of Control to a Looter. Bankers Life moved to dismiss on
the ground that it had no control over Manhattan at the time the
bonds were sold. Although the Supreme Court expressed no opinion
on the point,7 Bankers Life, while not participating in the sale of the
bonds, could be liable on at least two theories. First, if it had con-
spired with Begole to sell Manhattan to him in order to allow him to
loot the former Bankers Life subsidiary, then Bankers Life's acts
would have been part of the scheme to defraud, readily cognizable
under lOb-5. If Manhattan was not worth five million dollars, then
the difference between its true value and the sale price of the shares
could be regarded as a bribe. 9 The second and most intriguing
theory of liability is suggested by Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern
76. 404 U.S. at 101.
77. Compare Brief of Superintendent, supra note 70, at H-4 with Superintendent of Ins.
of New York v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 n.7 (1971).
78. The Superintendent did cite one case which he claimed found culpability for a conver-
sion of proceeds from an innocent sale. Parker v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 244 F. Supp.
267 (D. Colo. 1965). A close reading of the case reveals that the transaction was not analogous
to Bankers Life; rather, Parker involved a buyer who refused to pay for securities which he
had already received from the injured seller. Since the Supreme Court did not cite Parker, it
apparently did not find the case helpful. See 404 U.S. at 10 n.7.
79. 404 U.S. at 13.
80. See text accompanying note 108 infra.
81. 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
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Fiscal Corp.,"1 where holders of the controlling interest in an in-
vestment company sold it to a purchaser who financed the sale in
much the same way that Begole did."2 The corporation sued its
former controlling stockholders for breach of their state-law
fiduciary duty to find a suitable buyer. In finding liability, the court
stated that those who control a corporation owe a duty, in respect to
the transfer of control to outsiders, not to transfer it if the
circumstances surrounding the proposed transfer were such as
to put a prudent man on his guard. Those selling a control block
of stock must first satisfy themselves by means of a "reasonably
adequate" investigation that no fraud was likely to result.83 One
matter of importance to the Insuranshares court was "what was
known or to be inferred as to the manner in which the purchase
was to be financed."84 A prudent seller, the court maintained,
would want to know how three individuals could raise $310,000
to buy control of a company. Similarly, if Bankers Life did not
make a redsonable investigation into the background of Begole
and the source of the five million dollars, its negligence would be a
violation of the fiduciary duty owed to Manhattan. Moreover, the
Supreme Court's opinion states a basis for finding Bankers Life liable
under lOb-5 for such a breach:
The Congress made clear that "disregard of trust relationships by ...
fiduciaries, are all a single seamless web" along with manipulation, investor's
ignorance and the like. . .Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically
and restrictively.s
The idea of so extending l0b-5 had heretofore been directly tested
only once in court and abruptly dismissed. 8 Since the corporation
was neither a purchaser nor seller of its own stock, it lacked standing
to sue under 1Ob-5 for harm arising out of sale of controlling interest
82. The buyers arranged for an unsecured loan for the purchase price with the understand-
ing that, immediately after they achieved control, the company's portfolio of securities would
be pledged to the lender as collateral. The lender would then sell as much of the portfolio as
was needed to liquidate the debt and refund the balance to the buyers. In Bankers Life, Begole
sold the securities himself, turning over the proceeds to the lender. In both cases, the company
wound up paying for its own acquisition. 35 F. Supp. at 25.
83. Id.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. 404 U.S. at 11-12.
86. Erling v. Powell, 298 F. Supp. 1154 (D.S.D. 1969), affd, 429 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1970).
See Schwartz, The Sale of Control and the 1934 Act: New Directions for Federal Corporation
Law, 13 CORP. PRAC. CoNM. 73, 76, 102 (1971) for the view that lob-5 prohibits a sale of
control whereby the corporation or the minority stockholders are treated unfairly.
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to looters.87 Although Manhattan likewise was not a purchaser or
seller of its own shares, the Supreme Court's language may indicate
that Bankers Life's motion for dismissal may not fare so well on
remand. In the first place, the Superintendent can base his claim
against Bankers Life on the fraud in connection with the bond sale
on which he does have standing, arguing that it was a foreseeable
result of the negligent sale of control. More significantly, he can
make a strong argument that he now has standing to base his claim
on the sale of control itself, for the Supreme Court's treatment of the
whole issue of standing can be read as a final coup de grace for the
purchaser-seller doctrine.
Standing to Sue Under lOb-5 after Bankers Life
Purchaser-Seller Requirement. The purchaser-seller require-
ment was not an issue on this appeal, since it dealt only with the sale
of bonds in which Manhattan was unquestionably a seller. Conse-
quently, the Court was not obligated to refer to the Birnbaum test at
all. The Court's interest in examining the requirement, however, was
apparent in the oral argument. Mr. Justice White asked the attorney
for the SEC why he did not appeal the dismissal of the claim based
on the sale of Manhattan's stock to Begole. The counsel candidly
replied that he did not want the success of his case to hinge on the
overturning of the Birnbaum rule. Denied the opportunity to exam-
ine the intricacies of the purchaser-seller doctrine, the Court point-
edly noted that it expressed no opinion as to whether the Superintend-
ent had standing on that claim.89 In making this point, the Court cited
two commentators, one of whom argues that the requirement no
longer exists," the other asserting that courts have failed to develop
a consistent rationale in applying it." It is one thing for a court to
have no opinion on an issue not before it; it is quite another matter
to assert that the court does not have any such opinion. When this
"non-opinion" is buttressed by citations to a commentator who is
openly hostile to the rule and to another who finds the parameters of
87. See Loss 3614-19, for the view that this type of case is distinguishable from Birnbaum,
but that it might not be covered by lOb-5.
88. Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court, supra note 74.
89. 404 U.S. at 13 n.10.
90. Lowenfels, supra note 50.
91. Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing to Sue Under
Rule lOb-5 is Involved, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 93 (1970).
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the requirement to be uncertain, the assertion of a "non-opinion"
becomes rather intriguing. Depending on which of the two commen-
tators is more convincing to the Court, this "non-opinion" could
mean either: (1) the parameters of the requirement are so uncertain
that Manhattan might qualify as a purchaser of its own stock, an
interpretation which would, on the facts of Bankers Life, radically
alter the definition of "purchaser"; or (2) Manhattan was not a pur-
chaser, but need not be. If this latter interpretation is correct the
purchaser-seller doctrine is-finally-quite dead.12
An Enlarged Class of lOb-5 Plaintiffs? Creditors' Derivative
Actions. If read technically and restrictively, Bankers Life is not a
creditors' "derivative" action. An order commencing liquidation pro-
ceedings of an insurance company vests the Superintendent as liqui-
dator with all causes of action formerly belonging to the insurer. 3
Instead of creditors bringing suit on behalf of Manhattan for the
ultimate benefit of creditors, this suit was brought by the legal repre-
sentative of- Manhattan on behalf of Manhattan-for the benefit of
creditors. This distinction, probably incomprehensible to a layman,
clearly exalts form over substance, but it has been a necessary one.
As counsel for the Superintendent conceded, creditors do not ordinar-
ily have the right to bring suit on behalf of the corporation, although
92. Although the Court's apparent view of the purchaser-seller requirement may alarm
those for whom it has been one of the eternal verities of securities law, it is arguable that the
famous rule must fall when measured against contemporary tests for determining standing.
Repetition of the Birnbaum holding obscures the fact that the Birnbaum rule itself must be
tested by ordinary standing requirements. While "[g]eneralizations about standing to sue are
generally worthless as such," Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 151 (1970), the Court has stated that article III of the Constitution requires that the
plaintiff allege that he has suffered a genuine injury. Id. at 152. When the law under which he
seeks relief has limited applicability, the plaintiff must show that he is protected by it. See,
e.g., RESTAT6iIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286, comment f Birnbaum expressly held that a
non-purchaser or seller was simply not protected by lOb-5. See note 55 supra. But the granting
of injunctive relief to those who did not meet the Birnbaum test should have undercut that
argument. See note 54 supra. Nevertheless the standard has continued to be applied to damage
claimants, perhaps on the unarticulated assumption that, without a specific purchase or sale,
they could not demonstrate the existence of an injury which could be redressed by a court. Id.
Even this rationale loses some of its force when one considers the cases awarding damages for
incomplete transactions in which the plaintiff's loss would necessarily have to be estimated. See
notes 59-60 supra. In conclusion, it would seem that a plaintiff who can meet the tests for
standing articulated by the Supreme Court should not be forced to surmount another obstacle
erected by one of the circuits.
93. See note 7 supra.
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shareholders do.94 This disparity of treatment may seem justifiable in
view of the difference between the creditor-debtor and shareholder-
corporation relationships. The stockholder by definition owns a part
of the corporation, a portion whose value increases and decreases in
relation to the earnings of the company. In contrast the creditor's
interest is fixed; no matter how skillfully the corporation is managed,
he may demand no more than the amount owed him. If the debtor
corporation defaults, then the creditor's action is on the debt itself;
whether the failure to pay was caused by fraud, larcency, or merely
a down-turn in the business cycle ordinarily is of no concern to the
creditor."
Persuasive arguments in favor of a creditors' derivative action
may be made, however, particularly on the facts of Bankers Life.
Shareholders can bring actions on behalf of a corporation since they
stand in such a relationship to it that an injury to the corporation is
an injury to them. They do bring such actions because the directors
refuse to sue, often because the directors would be defendants in the
suit.9 However, it is clear that corporate mismangement, parti-
cularly when it is as egregious as Begole's, can greatly jeopardize
the security of the creditor's position. Where the sole stockholder
is himself the swindler, as in Bankers Life, it is equally apparent
that no one except the creditor will sue to recover the damages
suffered by the corporation.17 Moreover, the Bankers Life opinion
emphasized the fact that directors and controlling shareholders
owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation for the sake of creditors as
well as shareholders. As beneficiaries of that duty, creditors should
be allowed to enforce it by bringing derivative actions, particularly
when others will not seek judicial relief.
Direct Creditor Standing. The Supreme Court's concern for the
94. See oral argument, note 74 supra. Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
expressly provides for shareholder derivative actions. There is no corresponding "Creditors
Derivative" action.
95. Not only may creditors not sue to enjoin mismanagement of the debtor corporation,
but they may not enjoin merger of the debtor with another corporation merely because the
consolidated company's quick asset condition made it a less desirable debtor. See Cole v.
National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (1931).
96. A stockholder's derivative action alleges two wrongs, an act which caused damage to
the corporation and a refusal of the corporation itself to redress that act. Druckerman v.
Harbord, 174 Misc. 1077, 22 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
97. Unless, of course, the corporation is thrown into receivership or bankruptcy as hap-
pened here.
98. 404 U.S. at 12.
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creditors of a defrauded corporation leads to the question of whether
creditors may now claim that they, .as creditors, have been deceived
by a fraudulent transaction involving the purchase or sale of corpo-
rate securities. A creditor's derivative action might logically be
brought by those parties who were creditors at the time of the fraud,
since their claim is predicated on damage to the corporation which
affects their interests. A creditor who loans money to a company
after the fraudulent transaction stands in a different position. His
complaint is based on detrimental reliance on the false picture of
financial health presented by the corporation's books. To the extent
that the books misrepresent the effects of a fraudulent securities
transaction, a creditor may claim he was deceived in connection with
that transaction." Again, the main barrier to the individual creditor
action is, of course, the hoary purchaser-seller requirement. Since the
damages alleged by a creditor would not be the result of a securities
transaction in which he was either purchaser or seller, he would lack
standing to bring the action. If parts of the Bankers Life opinion may
be read at least as a broad hint that the Supreme Court has decreed
the demise of the purchase-seller requirement,""0 this main bar to the
creditors' action may be removed. Moreover, the Supreme Court's
concern for creditors would seem hollow indeed if they are forced to
wait until the debtor company is bankrupt-by definition unable to
pay its debts-before bringing a lOb-5 action to protect themselves
from the consequences of a transaction which jeopardizes their
chance of ever being paid.
Judicial Response to Bankers Life
The initial reaction of the lower courts to Bankers Life was cau-
tious. As a result of this decision, the Second Circuit sitting en banc
reversed an earlier panel decision in Drachman v. Harvey,""' but did
so on the narrowest grounds possible. Drachman was a derivative
action brought against the officers and former majority shareholders
of a corporation, alleging fraud in connection with the defendants'
sale of control of the corporation at a premium and their subsequent
redemption of all of the company's convertible debentures. While
99. See, e.g., Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1971). See note 65
supra.
100. See notes 88-92 supra and accompanying text; see text accompanying notes 110-11
infra.
101. 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1971).
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having an adverse effect on the corporation financially, 02 the redemp-
tion of the convertible debentures consolidated the controlling inter-
est of the control-purchaser. 03 The Second Circuit's panel court felt
bound by their decision in Bankers Life, which the court considered
to be analogous to Drachman.'04 Since the corporation neither bought
nor sold the controlling interest, there was no derivative standing for
the shareholders as to that transaction. Further, the court found it
unnecessary to decide that a redemption of outstanding bonds was a
purchase since the bonds were redeemed for a fair price. 05 For rule
1Ob-5 to be violated, the court asserted, the plaintiff must claim that
"the alleged fraud between the parties and/or alleged market manip-
ulations or deception is intrinsic to the securities transaction itself."'0"
After the Supreme Court decision in Bankers Life, Drachman was
reheard by the Second Circuit sitting en banc, which read Bankers
Life to hold that lOb-5 was violated whenever a purchaser or seller
suffers injury as a result of deceptive practices in connection with a
sale of securities.'07 Redemption of convertible debentures was held
to be a purchase of securities, thus giving the corporation standing
as to that claim. Further, the court ruled that the allegation of the
sale of control stock at a premium stated a breach of state law
fiduciary duty, which a federal district court could hear only under
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.' Having thus avoided the prob-
lems raised by Bankers Life, the en banc court triumphantly an-
nounced that there was no need to review the present limits of
Birnbaum at that time.
A bolder approach was taken by a New Jersey district court in
Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc.' In that case the plaintiffs had
owned a controlling interest in a close corporation. To secure this
102. All of the debentures were convertible into common stock. When they were redeemed,
the purchaser's interest was protected against dilution by conversion of the debentures. Id. at
725.
103. In order to obtain operating capital the company was forced to borrow in a period of
high interest rates. Id. at 725.
104. Id. at 730-33. Drachman is actually more similar to Birnbaum itself. See text accom-
panying notes 42-43 supra.
105. 453 F.2d at 732.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 737.
108. Id. at 738. Since the case involved the same parties litigating federal and nonfederal
claims arising out of the same transactions, the en banc court found that pendent jurisdiction
was proper. See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 62-65 (2d ed. 1970).
109. 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972).
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control they had an agreement with other shareholders which gave
the plaintiffs a right of first refusal on any shares sold by them or
issued by the company. The directors, defendants in the action, se-
cretly sold treasury stock to certain third parties breaching the agree-
ment and giving these third parties, also defendants, control of the
corporation. When the defense pointed out that the plaintiffs quali-
fied neither as purchasers nor sellers of the shares in question, the
court responded that such an argument sought to "revive the spectre
of the Birnbaum buyer-seller doctrine at a point in time when both
courts and legal scholars are seeking to bury it."' Significantly, the
court in Tully found that the continued existence of the purchaser-
seller doctrine was incompatible with the Bankers Life command that
section 10(b) be read flexibly rather than technically and restrictively.
In rejecting the Birnbaum standard, the district court stated that the
new test of standing was one of causation:
where there is a causal connection between the purchase or sale of stock, the
alleged fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, and plaintiff's loss then federal
jurisdiction under lOb-5 exists."'
Finally, lest any future court or commentator seek to distinguish
Tully on the ground that the relief sought was an injunction, the court
declared that the choice of remedy had no bearing whatsoever on the
plaintiff's standing to bring the action.12
Conclusion
Until more lower courts apply Bankers Life to specific fact situa-
tions, it will be far easier to curse the obscurity of the opinion than
to illuminate it. A court could be justified in saying that Bankers Life
left the state of 1Ob-5 law virtually unchanged, or that it made 1Ob-5
a universal solvent for all types of breaches of fiduciary duty and a
great triumph for the new "federal corporation law." If the case is
limited strictly to its facts and precise holding, it amounts to nothing
more than an assertion that a trustee in bankruptcy, vested by law
with all of the rights of a corporation, can bring an action under lOb-
5 when those in a fiduciary relationship with the bankrupt company
110. Id. at 839 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 842.
112. "Defendants have apparently confused subject matter jurisdiction with the notion of
remedy." Id. at 840. The defendants had claimed that the buyer-seller requirement could be
used when a prospective injunction was sought. The Tully court granted a retrospective injunc-
tion and therefore brushed aside the defendant's attempted distinction.
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have duped it into selling securities so that the proceeds could be put
to the private use of the fiduciaries.
On the other hand, the opinion invites a much broader applica-
tion. It could be concluded, without doing violence to the opinion,
that the Court would allow creditors of a corporation to bring lOb-5
actions for breaches of fiduciary duties owed to them; that the Court
finds the Birnbaum purchaser-seller doctrine to be ill-defined and
indefensible; and that negligent sale of a controlling interest to a
looter states a violation of lOb-5. At present, however, lOb-5 resem-
bles a person who has recently undergone plastic surgery. The sur-
geon has made no specific promises regarding the results, and most
of the bandages have yet to be removed. Until they are, all who deal
with 1Ob-5-plaintiffs, commentators, and, most of all, defense law-
yers-can only guess and hope that they are right.

